The  Cure  That Harms: Sexual Orientation-Based Asylum and the Changing DefInition of Persecution by Bennett, Alan G.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 29
Issue 2 Women's Law Forum Article 5
January 1999
The "Cure" That Harms: Sexual Orientation-Based
Asylum and the Changing Def Inition of
Persecution
Alan G. Bennett
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Immigration Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alan G. Bennett, The "Cure" That Harms: Sexual Orientation-Based Asylum and the Changing DefInition of Persecution, 29 Golden Gate
U. L. Rev. (1999).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss2/5
NOTE 
THE "CURE" THAT HARMS: 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED 
ASYLUM AND THE CHANGING 
DEFINITION OF PERSECUTION 
Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning 
to breathe free, the wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Immigration Act of 1917 was the first U.S. law to ex-
clude lesbian and gay aliens from entry into the United States. 2 
Congress excluded lesbians and gay men because of the medi-
cal and psychiatric communities' belief that homosexuality was 
a disease.3 However, with the elimination of homosexuality 
from the psychiatric lists of mental disorders has come the op-
portunity for gay men and lesbians to gain asylum in this coun-
1. Emma Lazarus, Statue of Liberty. 
2. See Jorge L. Carro, From Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority to AIDS: 
What is in the Future for Homosexual Aliens?, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 201, 208 (1989) 
(citing Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3,39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917)). 
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try.4 Congress ended the general exclusion of lesbian and gay 
aliens in 1990, thus allowing refugees to escape from sexual 
orientation-based persecution in their home countries. 5 Asy-
lum case law has established that lesbians and gays now meet 
the statutory requirements of "members of a particular social 
group" subject to persecution.6 As a result, gays and lesbians 
may now attempt to prove past persecution or a well-founded 
fear of future persecution in order to achieve asylum. 7 
While no statutory defInition of "persecution" exists, immi-
gration and federal circuit courts have determined the term's 
legal meaning. 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
have held that an asylum applicant need not show punitive 
intent to prove persecution.9 However, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagrees with the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the Board of Immigration Appeals regarding the defi-
nition of persecution, and has held that persecution requires 
"intent to punish the victim."lo As a result, a split exists among 
the federal circuit courts regarding persecution and its re-
quirements. ll U.S. asylum law needs a single defmition of per-
secution, which recognizes that offensive treatment, from 
which many lesbians and gay men suffer in numerous coun-
tries, constitutes persecution even without punitive intent on 
the part of the perpetrator. 
Part II of this note will discuss the history of sexual orienta-
tion-based asylum law. Further, it will outline the statutory 
4. See LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL RIGHTS COMMITTEE, NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAw, § 7.01(1)(2) (Roberta Achtenberg & Karen B. 
Moulding eds., West Group 1998) !hereinafter "SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW"J. 
5. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAw, supra note 4, § 7.01(1). See generally 
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067-77 (1990). The 
statute simply eliminated "sexual deviants" from its list of classes of excludable aliens. 
6. In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I & N Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990). 
7. See id. 
8. See MARK SILVERMAN, ET. AL., IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, 
WINNING ASYLUM CASES, § 3.2 (5th ed. 1998). 
9. See Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Kasinga, I. & 
N. Dec. 3278 (B.I.A. 1996). 
10. Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Pitcherskaia, 118 
F.3d at 648 n.9. 
11. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 648 n.9. 
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requirements for asylum, explain the legal procedure of gaining 
asylum, and discuss the case law recognition of lesbians and 
gay men as "a particular social group." In addition, it will ad-
dress the standards and defInitions of persecution. Part III 
will discuss Pitcherskaia v. INS, a Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals case that addressed sexual-orientation based persecution. 
Pitcherskaia was a Russian lesbian who applied for sexual ori-
entation-based asylum and whose application was initially re-
jected by an immigration court and the BIA before she ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit. In Pitcherskaia, the Ninth Circuit 
established a different standard from the Fifth Circuit which 
eliminated punitive intent as a requirement of persecution. 
Part IV will discuss the Fifth Circuit's decision in Faddoul v. 
INS where it required punitive intent for purposes of asylum. 
Part V will critique the Fifth Circuit's requirement of punitive 
intent and compare it with the Ninth Circuit's definition of 
persecution, which does not require evidence of punitive intent. 
Finally, Part VI will propose the uniform adoption of the Ninth 
Circuit's defInition of persecution by all Federal appeals courts 
and the maintenance of this definition by the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals. Further, it will apply the Ninth Circuit's 
definition of persecution to Alla Pitcherskaia's case, showing 
the importance of a definition of persecution that does not re-
quire punitive intent. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. GENERAL AsYLUM EUGIBILITY 
For decades, the prohibition against lesbian and gay immi-
grants was based on the medical and psychiatric communities' 
persistence in labeling homosexuality as a disease. 12 In 1917 
and again in 1952, U.S. immigration acts excluded lesbians and 
gay men from immigration eligibility because Congress ad-
hered to the psychiatric profession's labeling of lesbians and 
gays as being "mentally defective" or as having "psychopathic 
12. See Carro, supra note 2 at 208-209; Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 
Stat. 874, 875 (1917). 
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personalities." 13 In 1965, Congress further justified the exclu-
sion of lesbians and gays by excluding what it termed to be 
"sexual deviants from entry into the U.S."14 
In 1979, the American Psychiatric Association removed ho-
mosexuality from the class of mental disorders known as "sex-
ual deviation."15 Congress eventually recognized these chang-
ing medical and societal attitudes in its 1990 Immigration Act 
and ended the exclusion of gays and lesbians from immigration 
eligibility. 16 The Act's congressional report stated that the 
prior exclusion of groups such as lesbians and gays was based 
on "outmoded grounds."17 During debate on the proposed Act, 
Congressman Theodore Weiss of New York called this exclu-
sion of gays and lesbians "onerous and discriminatory."18 As a 
result of changing medical and political attitudes, lesbian and 
gay applicants are now eligible to meet the statutory require-
13. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 4, § 7.01(1)(2). See generally 
Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3; Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 
§ 403(13) (1952). 
14. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAw supra note 4, § 7.01(2) n. 26. See generally 
Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (1965), 
superseded by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067-77 
(1990). 
15. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAw, supra note 4, § 7.01(2) (citing Memo-
randum from Julius Richmond, Surgeon General and Assistant Secretary for Health, 
United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to William Foege and 
George Lythcott (Aug. 2, 1979), quoted in Memo. Op. for the Acting Comm'r, Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, No. 79-85, 3 Op. Office of Legal Counsel 457, 458 
(1979». The American Psychological Association, the American Public Health Associa-
tion, the American Nurses Association, and the Council of Advanced Practitioners in 
Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing of the American Nurses' Association have 
endorsed this position of the American Psychiatric Association. See Carro, supra note 2 
at 209 n.54. 
16. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067-77 
(1990). Section 601 of the Act lists the "classes of excludable aliens" who are unable to 
obtain visas and "who shall be excluded from admission into the United States." Un-
like the previous Act, the 1990 Act does not list "sexual deviants" as one of the "exclud-
able classes." Thus, lesbians and gays are not excluded. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
THE LAw, supra note 4, § 7.01(1)(2). 
17. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-955, at 128 (1990). 
18. 136 CONGo REC. H12358-03, H12367 (daily ed. October 27,1990) (Statement of 
Theodore Weiss). 
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ments for asylum. 19 These requirements are found within the 
defInition of refugee as set out by the Refugee Act of 1980.20 
A person will be considered a refugee within the meaning of 
the Act when the person has left her home country, a country 
where she was a resident, or if she has no nationality. 21 She 
must have fled that country because of past persecution or a 
well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion. 22 Finally, she must no longer be willing to 
live in her home country because of this persecution.23 Thus, if 
the person can prove past persecution or a well-founded fear of 
future persecution on the basis of one of fIve listed categories to 
an asylum officer, immigration court, or on appeal, then she 
will be eligible for asylum. 24 However, even if the applicant 
meets this statutory defInition of "refugee," the adjudicator 
must decide in his or her discretion whether to grant asylum. 25 
B. IMMIGRATION COURT PROCEEDINGS, APPEAL AND REVIEW 
To better understand the process that may lead to a success-
ful asylum application, it is important to fIrst understand the 
required legal procedure, including the complex system of im-
migration proceedings. The applicant must fIrst present her 
application to an Immigration and Naturalization Services 
(INS) asylum officer.26 The asylum officer may approve the ap-
19. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAw, supra note 4, § 7.01(2). See generally 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(42)(A) (1988). 
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) states: 
The term "refugee" means ... any person who is outside any country of such 
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside 
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion. 
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988). Female pronouns will be used to identifY 
asylum applicants throughout this article. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 2.4. 
26. See ARTHUR C. HELTON, 30TH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 
INSTITUTE, 1021 PRAC. L. INST. 243, 261 (1997). 
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plication or refer it to an immigration judge. 27 If the officer ap-
proves the application, asylum is awarded to the applicant. 28 
However, if the asylum officer does not approve the applica-
tion, then the applicant must appear before an immigration 
judge in a hearing to gain his or her approval and to avoid de-
portation.29 At the hearing, the INS will attempt to support its 
decision to refuse asylum.30 The applicant will attempt to 
prove her case for asylum.31 Both the applicant and the INS 
may present evidence for the record in support of their respec-
tive positions. 32 Neither state nor federal rules of evidence ap-
ply in immigration proceedings.33 However, evidence pr~sented 
must be relevant and conform to requirements of constitutional 
due process.34 
If the applicant persuades the immigration judge that she 
meets the statute's asylum requirements, the judge will grant 
asylum for an indefinite time period. 35 In addition, the appli-
cant's immediate family members who are still abroad may join 
her in the United States.36 One year after being granted asy-
lum, the applicant may apply to change her status to that of a 
permanent resident or she may retain asylum status. 37 
If, on the other hand, the immigration court rejects the ap-
plicant's asylum request, she may appeal her case to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals.38 Only one BIA exists and it reviews 
all appeals from immigration courts throughout the United 
States.39 The BIA will accept the appeal unless it is not suffi-
ciently specific as to the facts or legal questions at issue. 40 For 
27. See id. 
28. See SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 8.8. 
29. See HELTON, supra note 26, at 262. 
30. See id. at 261. 
31 See id. 
32. See id. 
33. See HELTON, supra note 26, at 261. 
34. See id. at 261-262. 
35. See id. at 262. 
36. See id. 
37. See HELTON, supra note 26, at 262. 
38. See id. at 264. 
39. See SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 2.5. 
40. See HELTON, supra note 26, at 264. 
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example, in a case where persecution is the legal issue, if the 
appeal does not clearly state that the immigration judge erro-
neously applied the defInition 9f persecution in the lower 
court's decision, the BIA may dismiss the appeal. 41 The BIA 
has several options on review. It can reject the application on 
appeal, remand a case to the immigration judge with instruc-
tions to follow the appropriate course of action, or grant asylum 
directly. 42 
If the BIA rejects the application on appeal, the applicant 
may then bring her case to the Federal circuit court of appeals 
that has jurisdiction over the area from which the case origi-
nated.43 The circuit court may then remand the case to the BIA 
with instructions for a ruling consistent with the Circuit 
Court's fmdings. 44 Furthermore, if a circuit court of appeals 
adopts a different rule than the BIA, the new rule will be ap-
plied within that court's circuit in future cases. 45 As a result, 
circuit splits may arise because of inconsistent rulings among 
the circuit courts regarding the same legal issue. 46 The split 
between the Ninth and Fifth Circuits regarding the defmition 
of persecution is an example of disagreement among the Circuit 
COurtS.47 
C. MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
In the past, one of the principal obstacles that faced lesbian 
and gay applicants when presenting an asylum application was 
the need to demonstrate that the persecution they suffered was 
on account of their "membership in a particular social group. "48 
In 1990, the BIA fIrst recognized gays and lesbians as members 
of a particular social group in In re Toboso Alfonso.49 
41. See id. 
42. See id. 
43. See id. 
44. See SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 2.5. 
45. See id. 
46. See Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 648 n.9 (9th Cir. 1997). 
47. See id. 
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Fidel Armando Toboso-Alfonso came to the U.S. from Cuba 
as part of the Mariel boat lift of 1980.50 In his application, To-
boso-Alfonso claimed that the Cuban Government repeatedly 
detained, incarcerated, and tortured gays. 51 He told the court 
how he had suffered numerous detentions simply because he 
was gay. 52 Further, Toboso-Alfonso supported his claims with 
newspaper articles and a 1985 report from Amnesty Interna-
tional detailing the persecution of gays in Cuba. 53 
While the Board did not grant asylum to Toboso-Alfonso, 
BIA Judge Robert Brown refused to have him returned to Cuba 
because he found that Toboso-Alfonso's homosexuality qualified 
him as a member of a particular social group that was subject 
to persecution. 54 He was "a member of a particular group of 
persons who share a common, immutable characteristic, and ... 
this characteristic is one which members of the group either 
cannot change or should not be required to change because it is 
fundamental to their individual identity or consciences."55 One 
of the court's factual findings was that people are not able to 
easily change their sexual orientation. 56 By recognizing To-
boso-Alfonso's homosexuality as an immutable characteristic, 
the judge distinguished this court's rmding from past holdings 
and allowed for the possibility that future gay and lesbian ap-
plicants would qualify as "a particular social group. "57 
50. See Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 820. Thousands of Cubans fled their 
country during this mass exodus. See id. 
51. See id. at 821. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. 
54. See Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 823. Judge Robert Brown did not grant 
him asylum because Toboso-Alfonso had been convicted for drug possession while in 
the U.S. The judge did not consider it to be a "particularly serious crime" but used his 
discretion in not awarding asylum. Id. 
55. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822, citing characteristics of "immutability" 
in In re Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). The American Psychiatric Association 
removed homosexuality from its list of mental illnesses in 1973. The majority of social 
and behavioral scientists believe that sexual orientation, be it gay, lesbian or hetero-
sexual, is an immutable characteristic and "highly resistant to change." Suzanne B. 
Goldberg, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death: Political Asylum and the Global Persecu-
tion of Lesbians and Gay Men, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 605, 613 n.55 (1993) (citing a long 
list of sources and studies on the subject). 
56. See Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822-823. 
57. See id. at 819. 
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In 1993, In re Tenorio laid the foundation for the official 
recognition of gays and lesbians as members of a particular 
social group by all u.s. immigration courts. 58 The Judge 
granted asylum to Marcelo Tenorio because of his sexualorien-
tation-based persecution. 59 Although immigration judge deci-
sions cannot set legal precedent, this case was ground-breaking 
because it was the fIrst immigration court decision to award 
asylum by acknowledging that gays and lesbians were mem-
bers of a particular social group. 60 Tenorio had been persecuted 
and feared future persecution by paramilitary groups in Brazil 
that targeted gays.61 While living in Rio de Janeiro, a group of 
men attacked, beat, and stabbed Tenorio after he had left a gay 
bar.62 They threatened him with worse treatment if he re-
turned to the bar.63 As a result of this persecution, Tenorio left 
Brazil and came to the United States.64 He feared he would be 
killed ifhe returned to his country. 55 
In In re Tenorio, the Judge followed the Toboso-Alfonso de-
cision by fInding gays and lesbians to be members of a par-:-
ticular social groUp.66 Judge Leadbetter found that gays and 
lesbians share a common trait that is fundamental to their 
identity and it is arguably an immutable characteristic. 67 The 
Judge also noted an Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 
ruling in which the Canadian court found that even if sexual 
orientation were a "voluntary condition," it would still be a 
condition so fundamental to a person's identity that a claimant 
should not be forced to change it.68 The Tenorio court's recogni-
tion of lesbians and gays as a '1>articular social group" made it 
58. In re Tenorio, No. A72·093·558 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco July 26, 1993), reo 
printed in REFUGEE LAw AND POLICY 713·720 (Karen Musalo et al. eds., 1997). 
59. See id. at 720. 
60. See Wade Lambert, Asylum Given to Gay Man, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2,1998. 
61. See Tenorio, supra note 58, at 714-716. 
62. See id. at 713-714. 
63. See id. 
64. See id. at 714. 
65. See Tenorio, supra note 58, at 714. 
66. Id. at 720. 
67. See id at 719. See also Lambert, supra note 60. 
68. Id. (citing Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Division) of Canada, T91-
04459 at 5 (April. 9, 1992». 
9
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easier for gays and lesbians to be granted asylum in future 
cases.69 
Following the Tenorio and Toboso-Alfonso decisions, in JWle 
1994, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno issued a directive 
(hereinafter "Reno Directive") to U.S. immigration courts to 
adopt the holding of In re Toboso-Alfonso as precedent.70 The 
Reno Directive set the standard for immigration courts and 
officially recognized that U.S. immigration courts may grant 
asylum to gays and lesbians on accoWlt of their persecution as 
members of a particular social groUp.71 Attorney General Reno 
fOWld that the publication of the Toboso-Alfonso decision would 
provide useful guidelines for immigration judges in evaluating 
cases involving gay and lesbian asylum applicants. 72 As a re-
sult of the Reno Directive, official precedent established that 
gays and lesbians qualified for asylum on the basis of member-
ship in a particular social group. 
D. WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF FuTURE PERSECUTION OR PAST 
PERSECUTION 
In addition to proving membership in a particular social 
group, lesbian and gay asylum applicants face the challenge of 
demonstrating persecution.73 Although Congress has lifted the 
ban on gay and lesbian immigrants and courts have now recog-
nized gays and lesbians as members of a particular social 
group, a homosexual applicant still must prove either (1) a 
well-foWlded fear of future persecution, or (2) actual past per-
69. See Lambert, supra note 60. 
70. See Toboso·Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 819 n.1 (citing Att'y Gen. Order no. 
1895-94 (June 19, 1994)). Janet Reno declared Toboso-Alfonso as "precedent in all 
proceedings involving the same issue or issues." Reno further stated in her memo: 
This case held that an individual, who has been identified as homosexual and 
persecuted by his or her government for that reason alone, may be eligible for 
relief under the refugee laws on the basis of persecution because of mem ber-
ship in a particular social group. I have examined the case and conclude that 
it represents an appropriate application of the law to the facts as described in 
the opinion. 
Queer Resources Directory, Memorandum from Janet Reno (last modified Sept. 13, 
1995) http://mother.qrd.org/qrdlwwwlworld/immigration/reno.html. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
73. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(42)(A) (1988). 
10
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secution.74 Proving persecution is usually the most difficult 
element for an asylum applicant to meet.75 
1. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution 
Proof of a well-founded fear of future persecution is one 
means of showing persecution. 76 This requires the applicant to 
demonstrate that she subjectively fears she will be persecuted 
if she returns to her home country.77 She must also prove this 
fear is objectively reasonable.78 Thus, an applicant must es-
tablish both a subjective and an objective component in order to 
meet the well-founded fear requirement. 79 
a) Subjective Fear of Persecution 
First, in rmding a well-founded fear of future persecution, 
the judge must examine the applicant's subjective mental 
state.80 An immigration judge needs to confIrm that fear exists 
in the mind of the applicant. 81 "Fear is a subjective state of 
mind, therefore evaluation of the applicant's opinions, feelings, 
and experiences is essential to a proper adjudication of the 
claim. "82 Further, nonverbal as well as verbal conveyances of 
fear play an important role in establishing an applicant's 
credibility and subjective fear.83 Hence, an immigration judge 
should observe an applicant's demeanor closely while she gives 
testimony at her asylum hearing.84 If the judge conclude.s that 
the applicant genuinely fears returning to her home country, 
74. See id. 
75. See SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 3.1. 
76. See id. 
77. Seeid. 
78. See id. 
79. See SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 3.1. 
80. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-431 (987). 
81. See id. 
82. SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 3.1 (citing ASYLUM BRANCH, OFFICE OF GENERAL 
COUNSEL, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, BASIC LAw MANUAL, 27 
(March 1991). 
83. See SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 3.1. 
84. See id. 
11
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the applicant will have satisfied the requirement of the "subjec-
tive" component. 85 
b) Objective Fear of Persecution 
However, subjective fear alone is not sufficient to establish 
an asylum claim based on fear of future persecution. 86 Immi-
gration judges rely strongly on the objective component when 
determining whether an applicant has a legitimate fear of fu-
ture persecution. 87 The BIA ruled in In re Mogharrabi that an 
applicant satisfies the objective requirement if she can show 
that a reasonable person in similar circumstances would fear 
future persecution.88 An applicant must present objective evi-
dence to support her position. 89 Further, the court will consider 
whether her home country has a history of persecuting people 
in similar circumstances. 90 Evidence of a country's treatment 
of gays and lesbians usually consists of a compilation of official 
and non-governmental sourceS.91 The applicant will attempt to 
present documentation of the persecution of lesbian and gay 
men in her country.92 For example, U.S. State Department re-
ports can be used, as well as reports made by lesbian and gay 
human rights associations.93 Therefore, a well-founded fear can 
be based on what has happened to others who are similarly 
situated. 94 Further, specific evidence, such as eyewitness ac-
counts of threats of persecution, may be valuable evidence as 
well.95 
85. See In re Mogharrabi, 191. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (RI.A. 1987). 
86. See id. 
87. See SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 3.I. 
88. See Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 445. 
89. See id. at 44l. 
90. See id. at 446. 
91. See SILVERMAN, supra note 8 at § 13.4. 
92. See id. 
93. See Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 1997); Amici Curiae Brief in 
support of Alia K. Pitcherskaia at 22-23, Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 
1997) (No. 95-70887), reprinted in ASYLUM BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A 
RESOURCE GUIDE § I.C at 45 (Sydney Levy, ed., The International Gay and Lesbian 
Human Rights Commission and Lambda Legal Defense Fund, 1996) !hereinafter 
"IGLHRC Resource Guide"]. 
94. See Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 446. 
95. See id. at 448. 
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However, documentation and other corroborative evidence 
are, at times, difficult to obtain.96 Few countries record human 
rights violations against lesbians and gays.97 This lack of 
documentation is often the result of the underlying homophobia 
that permeates many countries.98 Further, the applicant often 
cannot return to her country to obtain evidence because of the 
existing threat that brought her to apply for asylum in the first 
place.99 Therefore, the applicant's testimony alone may suffice 
if it is credible, persuasive, and specific. lOO If the applicant's 
testimony is "believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to 
provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis for the 
fear," then her testimony is credible. lol The immigration judge 
uses her own discretion to determine if the applicant's testi-
mony has met these requirements. 102 Each case is assessed 
independently on its own particular merits. 103 
If the applicant meets the subjective and objective require-
ments of a well-founded fear of future persecution, then the 
applicant will have proven persecution in her case. 104 As a re-
sult, the applicant meets one of the statutory requirements for 
asylum. lOa 
c) Standard for a Well-founded Fear of Future Persecution 
In 1987, the u.S. Supreme Court, in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca:l!J6 clarified the standard by which courts will deter-
mine if an applicant has a well-founded fear of future persecu-
tion. Although the Court did not attempt to define a well-
founded fear, it ruled that the well-founded fear standard re-
96. See id. at 445. 
97. See Nicole LaViolette, Proving a Well-Founded Fear, The Evidentiary Burden 
in Refugee Claims Based on Sexual Orientation, reprinted in IGLHRC Resource Guide, 
supra note 93, § I.D at 5. 
98. See id. at 6. 
99. See Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 444. 
100. See id. at 445. 
101. [d. 
102. See id. at 446. 
103. See Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 446. 
104. See SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 3.1. 
105. See id. 
106. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
13
Bennett: Asylum Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
292 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:279 
quires a lesser degree of proof than a clear probability stan-
dard. l07 By its ruling, the Court lessened the applicant's bur-
den. loa Under this new standard, an applicant may prove that 
she has a well-founded fear of persecution even when there is 
less than a 50% chance that persecution will actually take 
place. I09 Furthermore, the Court stated in dicta that even if an 
applicant can show that she has only a 10% chance of being 
"shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted," then she has a well-
founded fear of the event happening. 110 The Court held that an 
immigration court should rely on objective evidence and the 
subjective persuasiveness of the applicant's testimony in order 
to meet this standard. lll 
2. Past Persecution-Threats to "Life and Freedom" and 
other Forms of Past Persecution 
In addition to a well-founded fear of future persecution, an 
applicant may be granted asylum because she has suffered past 
persecution. 1l2 When past persecution has threatened an asy-
lum applicant's "life or freedom," it is presumed that one or the 
other would again be threatened if the applicant returned to 
her country. 113 Hence, she will attempt to prove that the past 
harm she suffered constituted a ''threat to her freedom or 
life."114 Similar to proving a well-founded fear of future perse-
cution, the applicant may prove past persecution by presenting 
subjective and objective evidence of past events. 115 The judge 
will examine documented evidence and persuasive testimony in 
. order to determine ifpast persecution occurred. 116 
107. See id at 431. 
108. See id. Prior to Cardoza-Fonseca, courts interpreted the standard to be a 
"clear probability." The clear probability standard required a 50 percent chance or 
more probability that the applicant would be persecuted if she returned to her country. 
109. See d.· 
110. INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.s. 421, 431 (1987). 
111. See Mogharrabi, 191. & N. Dec. at 443-444. 
112. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) 42 (A) (1988). 
113. See SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 3.5. 
114. [d. 
115. See id.; see also discussion, supra Part II.D.1. 
116. See id. 
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Further, even if the past persecution did not constitute a 
threat to the applicant's life or freedom, an applicant may ar-
gue that the harm nevertheless qualifies as persecution. 117 The 
Ninth Circuit ruled in Desir v. Ilchert 118 that persecution en-
compasses more than the statutory term of "threat to life or 
freedom." For example, the withdrawal of all economic oppor-
tunities or "a deliberate imposition of substantial economic dis-
advantage" may constitute persecution. 119 In Gonzalez v. 
INS,12O the Ninth Circuit found that a Nicaraguan had suffered 
from economic persecution. The government confiscated her 
property, took away her ration card, and forced her to liquidate 
her business. 121 As a result, the court found that the applicant 
had suffered from an economic deprivation equivalent to perse-
cution. l22 Thus, even if the applicant cannot show that her past 
persecution was so extreme as to constitute a "threat to her life 
or freedom," she may still prove that she suffered from past 
persecution if she can prove substantial econODllC 
deprivation. 123 
However, even if the applicant successfully proves past per-
secution, the statute allows an immigration judge to use her 
own discretion and require the applicant to show a well-
founded fear of future persecution as well. 124 Although past 
persecution is presumed to include a well-founded fear of fu-
ture persecution, this is a rebuttable presumption. l25 To over-
come the presumption, the INS bears the burden of showing, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that conditions in the appli-
cant's home country have changed significantly so that the ap-
plicant no longer has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if 
she returns there. 126 If the immigration judge fmds significant 
changes have occurred, she may deny the application on the 
117. See SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 3.5. 
118. 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988). 
119. SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 3.5 (citing Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 
1996)). 
120. See Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1996). 
121. See id. 
122. See id. 
123. See SILVERMAN, supra note 8, § 3.5. 
124. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(I)(i) (1998). 
125. See id. 
126. See id. 
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basis that the applicant does not meet the statutory require-
ments for a refugee. 127 
E. CASE LAW DISAGREEMENT REGARDING THE DEFINITION OF 
PERSECUTION 
A dilemma exists for immigration courts, the BIA and cir-
cuit courts because the Immigration and Nationality Act does 
not defme persecution. 128 Courts have used two competing 
defmitions of persecution in asylum case law that differ as to 
the requirement of "punitive intent. "129 Courts that follow the 
fust defmition that requires punitive intent generally exclude 
applicants who cannot show their persecutor has a subjective 
intent to punish. l30 This defmition focuses upon the persecu-
tor's intention. 131 Those that follow the alternative defmition, 
which lacks this punitive intent requirement, allow for !'offen-
sive" treatment to be deemed persecution. 132 Following this 
meaning, a judge considers the victim's suffering while the per-
secutor's intent is irrelevant. Federal courts of appeals defer to 
the BIA's defmition unless the court disagrees with the Board's 
interpretation. 133 Because federal circuit courts have disagreed 
over this defmition, the application of law regarding persecu-
tion differs among the circuits. l34 Further, the Supreme Court 
has not ruled on the appropriate de~tion of persecution with 
regard to intent. 
In 1987, the BIA held that to fmd persecution, "harm or suf-
fering must be inflicted upon the victim in order to punish her 
for possession of a belief or characteristic the persecutor seeks 
to overcome."I35 Hence, under this defmition, an applicant 
must prove that the persecutor possessed a motive to punish in 
order for persecution to exist. l36 The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (1988). 
128. [d. 
129. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 648 n.9. 
130. See Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994). 
131. See id. 
132. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 647. 
133. See id. at 646. 
134. See id. at 647. 
135. Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 223. 
136. Se.e id. 
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peals followed this BIA assessment that a persecutor must 
have a punitive intent. 137 
However, in the 1996 case of In re Kasinga,t38 the BIA re-
visited the "punitive intent" requirement for purposes of asy-
lum eligibility and held that forms of persecution exist that do 
not entail punitive intent but cause the victim to suffer none-
theless. Thus, using this second defInition, the BIA found that 
female genital mutilation, regardless of the persecutor's intent, 
was a form of persecution and expressly held that a subjective, 
punitive, or malignant intent was not required for harm or suf-
fering to constitute persecution. 139 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the requirement of ''punitive intent" in the 1997 case 
of Pitcherskaia v. INS .140 
III. PITCHERSKAlA v. INS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S 
DEFINITION OF PERSECUTION. 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Alla K. Pitcherskaia grew up in a family targeted by the 
Russian government. 141 Her father was an artist who had been 
arrested and imprisoned for distributing anti-government lit-
erature. 142 He ultimately.died in prison. 143 
Beginning at age 27, Pitcherskaia repeatedly suffered po-
lice-enforced, involuntary psychiatric treatment because she 
was a lesbian. 144 Pitcherskaia's girlfriend was forced into a 
psychiatric institution for more than four months because she 
was a lesbian. 145 While institutionalized, her girlfriend was 
137. Faddoul, 37 F.3d at 188. 
138. I. & N. Dec. no. 3278 (BIA 1996). 
139. See id. 
140. See Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 1997). 
141. See id. 
142. See id. 
143. See id at 6. 
144. Brief for Pitcherskaia at 6, Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(No. 95·70887), reprinted in ASYLUM BASED SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A RESOURCE GUIDE 
§ I.C at 6 (Sydney Levy, ed., The International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Com· 
mission and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 1996). 
145. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 644. 
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forced to undergo electroshock treatment, along with a variety 
of other "therapies. "146 This was done in an effort to change her 
sexual orientation. 147 When Pitcherskaia visited her detained 
girlfriend, the clinic registered her as a "suspected lesbian. "148 
Clinic officials also told her she must receive treatment at her 
local clinic every six months to cure her of her lesbianism. 149 
The "treatments" included sedation and psychotropic medica-
tion, as well as electroshock therapy.l50 When Pitcherskaia re-
fused to submit to "treatment," the police found her and forci-
bly took her to the clinic. 151 She was assigned to a psychiatrist 
who told her to love men. 152 Further, he wanted Pitcherskaia to 
fIx what he called her "wrong sexuality."I53 
Pitcherskaia submitted herself to eight of these "treatment" 
sessions, and although she denied being a lesbian in order to 
protect herself, she was diagnosed by the clinic as having "slow 
growing schizophrenia," a medical term used to label lesbians 
and gays by Russian authorities. l54 The attending psychiatrist 
prescribed sedatives and tried to hypnotize her as part of the 
"treatment.m55 
In 1990, and again in 1991, the Russian militia arrested 
Pitcherskaia while she was in the home of gay friends and im-
prisoned her for the night. l56 She also received several "De-
mands for Appearance" because the militia wanted to interro-
gate her further regarding her sexual orientation. 157 
Pitcherskaia entered the U.S. with a tourist visa on March 
22, 1992 when she was 30 years old. l58 Soon after her arrival in 
146. See id. 
147. See id. 
148. [d. 
149. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 644. 
150. See id.; see also Brief for Pitcherskaia, supra note 144, at 6. 
151. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 644. 
152. See Brief for Pitcherskaia, supra note 144, at 6. 
153. [d. 
154. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 644. 
155. See id. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. 
158. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 643; Brieffor Pitcherskaia, supra n.ote 144, at 5. 
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the U.S., Pitcherskaia received two additional "Demands for 
Appearance" which were sent to her mother's home in 
Russia. 159 Since she did not answer these demands, Pitcher-
skaia feared the Russian authorities would follow through with 
past threats and forcibly institutionalize her if she returned 
home. ISO 
On June 2, 1992, after her mother warned her that the Rus-
sian militia was still looking for her, Pitcherskaia applied for 
asylum in this country.161 She claimed she feared persecution 
in Russia because of her father's and her own anti-Communist 
political activities. 162 The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service Asylum Office in San Francisco conducted Pitcher-
skaia's interview and concluded that her statements regarding 
her past persecution in Russia were credible. l63 However, using 
its discretionary authority, the INS found that she had failed to 
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution and thus 
denied her application for asylum. l64 As she had over-stayed 
her tourist visa, the INS placed her in deportation , 
proceedings. 165 
Before completion of her deportation proceedings, Pitcher-
skaia again requested asylum. l66 In her new application, she 
made the additional claim that she had been persecuted be-
cause of her opinions as a lesbian activist and her membership 
in a particular social group, Russian lesbians. 167 She also 
claimed a well-founded fear of future persecution. 166 
Pitcherskaia's application was again denied after the second 
hearing before the immigration judge. 169 The judge concluded, 
"based upon the entire record, including the Court's observa-
159. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 645. 
160. See id. 
161. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 643; Brief for Pitcherskaia, supra note 144, at 4. 
162. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 643. 
163. See id. 
164. See id. 
165. See id. 
166. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 643. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. 
169. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 645. 
19
Bennett: Asylum Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
298 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:279 
. tion of the. demeanor of the respondent as well as her witness 
while testifying and after consideration of the arguments of 
counsel," Pitcherskaia had not proved her case for asylum. 170 
Therefore, she did not meet the requirements of asylum, nor 
was she granted a withholding of deportation. 171 
B. THE BlA's HOLDING 
Following this rejection, Pitcherskaia followed the normal 
procedural process and appealed her case to the BIA. 172 In a 
Two to one decision, the majority found that her forced psychi-
atric treatment did not amount to persecution. 173 
In reaching its decision, the majority relied on the prior BIA 
holdings in In re Mogharrabi and In re Acosta. 174 Both cases 
stated the standard for proving persecution included an "intent 
to punish."175 In those cases, the courts concluded that an ap-
plicant may establish that she has a well-founded fear of perse-
cution if she proves that: (1) the persecutor seeks to overcome a 
belief or characteristic of the victim by using punishment of 
some sort; (2) the persecutor is aware that the victim possesses 
the characteristic sought to be overcome; (3) the persecutor is 
able to punish the victim; and (4) the persecutor desires to 
punish the victim for possessing the characteristic sought to be 
overcome. 176 Here, the majority of the BIA focused on the 
fourth element and required Pitcherskaia to prove that the 
Russian authorities intended to punish her because she was a 
lesbian. l77 The Board ruled that because the Russian militia 
intended to "cure" her of her lesbianism, the forced "treat-
ments" and confinement were not intended as punishment. 178 
Because there was no intent to punish, the BIA concluded that 
there was no persecution. 179 The Board found that, without 
170. [d. 
171. See id. 
172. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 645. See also discussion supra Part II.B. 
173. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 645. 
174. See id. at 647. 
175. See id. at 647. 
176. See id. 
177. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 645. 
178. See id. 
179. See id. 
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such punishment, persecution was not present. 180 Without 
proof of persecution, Pitcherskaia's asylum application lacked 
foundation. 181 
Further, the BIA did not find that Pitcherskaia possessed a 
well-founded fear offuture persecution. The majority noted the 
symbolic 1993 repeal of the anti-sodomy law of the Russian Pe-
nal Code. 182 The BIA concluded that this change of law in the 
former Soviet Union made it unlikely that Pitcherskaia would 
be intentionally persecuted in the new Russian Republic. 183 
Because she could not prove past or future persecution, 
Pitcherskaia's asylum application was rejected. However, the 
BIA allowed Pitcherskaia the option of voluntary departure 
rather than subjecting her to immediate deportation. 184 
Chairman Schmidt dissented. l85 First, he concluded that 
Pitcherskaia was eligible for asylum as a member of a particu-
lar social group because she was a Russian lesbian. l86 He fur-
ther disagreed with the majority's conclusion that an asylum 
applicant must prove that her persecutor had an "intent to 
punish." 187 Finally, he rejected the majority's conclusion that 
the situation for gays and lesbians in Russia had improved. 188 
Chairman Schmidt most likely relied on Pitcherskaia's 
presentation of documents showing the continued persecution 
of lesbians and gays in Russia. 189 For example, Pitcherskaia 
presented Department of State Country Reports for 1992, 1994, 
and 1995 that demonstrated the uninterrupted use of involun-
180. See id. 
181. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 645. 
182. See id.; Amici Curiae Brief in support of AlIa K. Pitcherskaia, at 27, Pitcher-
skaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-70887) reprinted in ASYLUM BASED 
ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, A RESOURCE GUIDE § I.C (Sydney Levy, ed., The Interna-
tional Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission and Lambda Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, 1996). 
183. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 645. 
184. See id. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. 
187. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 645. 
188. See id. 
189. See id. 
21
Bennett: Asylum Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
300 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:279 
tary psychiatric treatment against lesbians by Russian 
authorities. 190 Those documents indicated that, even though 
the Russian anti-sodomy provision had been repealed, the Rus-
sian militia continued to have the legal means to harass, ar-
rest, and detain lesbians and gay men under the vague, catch-
all provisions in the Russian Criminal Code known as "hooli-
ganism" laws.191 In addition, Pitcherskaia presented evidence 
of numerous documented instances of police harassment of gay 
men and lesbians, including beatings, arbitrary searches, and 
armed intimidation by the Russian militia. 192 Further, Pitcher-
skaia presented evidence that the Russian Ministry of Justice 
continues to keep lists of known gays and lesbians in order to 
monitor and track them. 193 As a result, the BIA's dissenting 
judge indicated that he would have granted Pitcherskaia asy-
lum. 194 
After the BIA rejected her application, Pitcherskaia ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit. 195 She argued and submitted her appeal on December 11, 
1996.196 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
The issue on appeal was whether the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act requires an applicant to prove that the persecutor 
''harbored a subjective intent to harm or punish when perse-
cuting the victim. "197 
Persecution is a legal question reviewed de novo. 198 Nor-
mally, federal courts of appeal follow the BIA's intel-pretations 
because the Act does not define persecution. 199 However, if the 
190. See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 182, at 22-23. 
191. See id. at 27-28. 
192. See id. at 23. For example, in 1993, for no apparent reason, uniformed police-
men attacked and severely beat two lesbians outside a gay disco in St. Petersburg. 
193. See id. at 24-25. 
194. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 645. 
195. See id. at 641. 
196. See id. 
197. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 643. 
198. See id. at 646. 
199. See id. 
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circuit court fmds the BIA's interpretation to be "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or manifestly contrary to statute," the court can over-
rule this defmition and impose another. 200 
Here, the Ninth Circuit found the BIA's defmition of perse-
cution to be contrary to the statute.201 The court stated, "Pitch-
erskaia claims that the BIA had applied an erroneous legal 
standard by insisting that an intent to punish is a necessary 
element of persecution."202 The court agreed with Pitcherskaia 
and found that the BIA had erred in requiring Pitcherskaia to 
prove punitive intent.203 Further, in support of its decision, the 
court noted that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Cir-
cuit has ever required an asylum applicant to show that her 
persecutor had the intention of inflicting harm or 
punishment.204 
The court found that the term "punishment" implied that 
the perpetrator believed the victim did some wrong or commit-
ted a crime. 205 As a result, the perpetrator then took action in 
retribution.206 Persecution, on the other hand, only required 
that the perpetrator caused the victim suffering or harm. 207 
Although many asylum cases involved situations where the 
persecutor had a subjective intent to punish, the court con-
cluded that punitive intent was not required in order to estab-
lish persecution. 208 
In clarifying this new legal standard, the court stated that 
the defmition of persecution is objective. 209 The court wrote 
"[w}e have defined persecution as the infliction of suffering or 
harm upon those who differ ... in a way regarded as 
offensive. "210 Since the existence of persecution is an objective 
200. [d. 
201. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 647. 
202. [d. at 646. 
203. See id. 
204. See id. 
205. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 647. 
206. See id. at 647. 
207. See id. at 647-648. 
208. See id. at 646. 
209. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 646. 
210. [d. at 647. 
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determination, it is thus defined by what a reasonable person 
would consider "offensive."211 It is irrelevant that ''the person 
inflicts suffering or harm in an attempt to elicit information, 
for his own sadistic pleasure, to 'cure' his victim, or to save his 
soul. "212 The court analogized to the dark acts of the Spanish 
Inquisition.213 Even though the inquisitors believed they were 
saving misguided believers through the infliction of pain, they 
were, in fact, persecuting their victims. 214 The court concluded 
that an act was persecution if a reasonable person would find it 
offensive.215 
The Ninth Circuit reiterated that either a victim's past per-
secution or a well-founded fear of future persecution may pro-
vide eligibility for a grant of asylum.216 However, the court did 
not address Pitcherskaia's claims of whether she had estab-
lished the requisite subjective and objective components of a 
well-founded fear of persecution. 217 This was left to be decided 
on remand.218 Thus, the Ninth Circuit sent Pitcherskaia's case 
back to the BIA and required it to apply the proper defmition of 
persecution, as stated in its decision. 219 The Ninth Circuit did 
not address whether Pitcherskaia had established a legitimate 
claim of asylum under the correct definition of persecution. 220 
As of the time pf this writing, the BIA has not yet returned its 
decision regarding Pitcherskaia's asylum status. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 647 n.8. 
214. See id. During oral arguments, Judge Betty Fletcher forced the INS attorney 
to concede that the tortures and murders of the Inqusition were persecution even 
though its purpose was to save souls. Carol Ness, INS Loses Case over Russia's Treat· 
ment ofS.F. Woman, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 25,1997. 
215. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 647. 
216. See id. at 645. 
217. See id. at 648. 
218. See id. 
219. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 648. 
220. See id. 
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IV. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S REQUIREMENT OF 
PUNITIVE INTENT 
Despite the reasonableness of the Ninth Circuit's definition 
of persecution, disagreement exists among the Circuits re-
garding this legal issue. 221 While the Ninth Circuit recognizes 
persecution as the infliction of suffering or harm in a way re-
garded as offensive to a reasonable person, the Fifth Circuit 
fmds persecution only when the perpetrator acts with the in-
tent to punish the victim.222 In Pitcherskaia, the Ninth Circuit 
expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit's punitive intent require-
ment as adopted in the latter's 1994 decision in Faddoul v. 
INS.2ZJ 
Faddoul sets out the Fifth Circuit's defmition of persecu-
tion. Elias Faddoul was a thirty-three year old man of Pales-
tinian ancestry who was born and raised in Saudi Arabia. 224 
The Saudi government restricted the travel rights of Palestini-
ans and other non-Saudis.225 Further, the government excluded 
non-citizens from all schools of higher education. 226 Faddoul 
applied for asylum in the U.S. claiming persecution because 
Saudi Arabia denied Palestinian residents, even those born 
within its borders, the right to own property or a business, at-
tend a Saudi university, marry a Saudi citizen, or travel within 
Saudi Arabia without written permission. 227 As a result, Fad-
doul claimed that the Saudi government persecuted him be-
cause of his Palestinian ancestry.228 
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, concluding that all non-Saudis, 
regardless of their origin, do not receive the full rights of Saudi 
citizens.229 The fact that Saudi law grants citizenship only to 
those of Saudi ancestry did not show particularized persecution 
221. See Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d at 643, 648 n.9 (9th Cir. 1997). 
222. See id.; Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994). 
223. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 648 n.9. 
224. See Faddoul, 37 F.3d at 187. 
225. See id. at 188. 
226. See id. at 189. 
227. See id. at 187. 
228. See Faddoul, 37 F.3d at 188-189. 
229. See id. 
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against Palestinians.23O Further, the court's defmition of perse-
cution required "a showing by the alien that harm or suffering 
will be inflicted upon him in order to punish him for possessing 
a belief or characteristic a persecutor sought to overcome. "231 
Under this standard, for persecution to exist, the Saudi gov-
ernment would have to intentionally single out Palestinians 
and punish them with discriminatory treatment. 232 
However, the court noted that Palestinians born in Saudi 
Arabia receive the same rights and are. subject to the same dis-
crimination as, for example, Saudi-born Egyptians.233 The 
court maintained that Faddoul could not prove persecution 
without demonstrating the Saudi government's clear intention 
to punish Palestinians by depriving them of education, prop-
erty and travel rights.234 The court found no evidence that the 
government had ever arrested, detained, interrogated, or 
harmed Faddoul to punish him because of his ancestry. 235 
Thus, the court did not fmd the required punitive intent neces-
sary for persecution to exist.236 As a result, the court affirmed 
the BIA's denial of Faddoul's asylum application. 237 
v. THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF A "PUNITIVE INTENT" 
REQUIREMENT 
The adoption of a particular defmition of persecution by a 
court can have a meaningful effect on the outcome of an asylum 
case. 238 If the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts had exchanged 
positions in Faddoul and Pitcherskaia regarding the punitive 
requirement, their holdings in the respective cases might have 
230. See id. at 188. 
231. [d. 
232. See Faddoul, 37 F.3d at 188. 
233. See id. at 189. 
234. See id. 188, 189. 
235. See id. at 188. 
236. See id at 188, 189. 
237. See Faddoul, 37 F.3d at 193. In addition, the court found that the Saudi gov-
ernment's treatment of Faddoul did not amount to persecution because, "the decision to 
bestow or deny citizenship is deeply-rooted in national sovereignty and must be left to 
the individual nation's discretion." [d. at 189. 
238. Compare generally Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d. 641 (9th Cir. 1997), with 
Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d. 185 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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been different. The Ninth Circuit's defInition of persecution 
could have facilitated the fmding of persecution in Faddoul's 
circumstances. The Ninth Circuit, as stated in Pitcherskaia, 
did not require the persecutor to possess an "intent to punish 
the victim. H239 Faddoul would not have had to prove that the 
Saudi government intended to punish Palestinian residents by 
refusing to grant them full citizenship rights. Thus, in Fad-
doul, under the Ninth Circuit's defmition, although the appli-
cant would still need to prove that he had been persecuted be-
cause he was Palestinian, he would not have had to prove that 
the Saudi government intended to punish him. The govern-
ment's lack of a subjective intent to punish would have been 
irrelevant to fmding persecution.240 
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit's requirement of punitive intent 
could preclude a finding of persecution where the Ninth Cir-
cuit's defmition would allow for it. For example, if the Ninth 
Circuit had req'liired punitive intent in Pitcherskaia, the court 
probably would have affirmed the BIA's decision to deny Pitch-
erskaia's asylum application. If the court had required puni-
tive intent, it probably would have affirmed the BIA's holding 
and rejected the notion that Pitcherskaia's "treatment" was 
persecution because the Russian authorities claimed that they 
were attempting to "cure" Pitcherskaia of her lesbianism, not 
punish her. As a result, the court probably would not have 
found persecution in Pitcherskaia's case. 
VI. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DEFINITION OF 
PERSECUTION FOR PURPOSES OF ASYLUM IS CORRECT 
AND SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY ALL CIRCUIT COURTS 
The legal issue of punitive intent for purposes of asylum 
clearly divides the circuits. 241 This division should end and all 
courts should agree that punitive intent is not a requirement 
for persecution. The Ninth Circuit's holding in Pitcherskaia 
has eliminated punitive intent as a required element of perse-
~------------------------------------------------
239. Pitcherskaia. 118 F.3d at 647. 
240. See id. 
241. Pitcherskaia v. INS. 118 F.3d 641. 648 n.9. (9th Cir. 1997). 
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cution, while the Fifth Circuit continues to require "intent to 
punish the victim" as a prerequisite to persecution. 242 This 
author proposes that the Ninth Circuit's defInition of persecu-
tion should be the standard used by all courts that rule on 
asylum applications because the defInition focuses upon the 
victim's deprivation, harm or suffering rather than the perse-
cutor's intent. Because the Ninth Circuit does not follow the 
Fifth Circuit's defInition of persecution, Ana Pitcherskaia does 
not have to establish her persecutor's intent to punish on re-
mand.243 Pitcherskaia may prove persecution on remand by 
showing that the Russian authorities harmed her because' she 
was a lesbian, and did so in a manner that a reasonable person 
would consider "offensive. "244 In other words, she must show 
that her detention, ''treatment," and receipt of threats of elec-
troshock therapy were persecution by a reasonable person's 
standard. 245 
The Ninth Circuit's position on "punitive intent" is sup-
ported by the BIA's decision in In re Kasinga.246 In Kasinga, 
the BIA awarded asylum to Fauziya Kasinga after concluding 
that ''punitive'' or "malignant" intent was not a necessary ele-
ment of persecution. 247 Kasinga, a Togolese woman, sought· 
asylum in order to avoid female genital mutilation (FGM), a 
common practice in her country. 248 Kasinga, who came to the 
U.S. in 1994, had not yet been mutilated, and feared that her 
tribe would subject her to FGM upon her return to her 
country.249 U.S. State Department Reports confIrmed that over 
50 percent of Togolese women may have been victims of the 
extremely painful and harmful procedure of FGM.25O The BIA 
agreed with the applicant that FGM is a "severe bodily inva-
sion" even if done with "subjectively benign intent. "251 Hence, 
242. Id. 
243. See id. at 648 n.9. 
244. Pitcherskaia, ll8 F.3d at 647. 
245. See id. at 647. 
246. 1. & N. Dec. 3278 (B.LA. 1996). 
247. In re Kasinga, 1. & N. 3278. 
248. See id. 
249. See id. 
250. See Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. 3278. 
251. Id. 
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even though Kasinga's tribe did not possess an intent to punish 
her, the BIA found that Kasinga could be subjected to offensive 
harm if she were returned to Togo.252 
In Pitcherskaia, as noted, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the 
BIA's definition of persecution in In re Kasinga.253 Although 
many asylum cases involve actors who had a subjective intent 
to punish their victims, this subjective "punitive" intent should 
not be required to show that harm constituted persecution. 254 
Pitcherskaia's persecutors believed that their "treatment" and 
confinement was "good. for" her.255 However, this did not make 
their actions any less painful.256 This treatment and therapy 
was clearly "offensive" to Pitcherskaia and would be to any rea-
sonable person. 257 The court stated that the masking of physi-
cal and mental torture as "cures" and "treatments" ignored 
human rights lawS.258 Here, Pitcherskaia's ''treatment" clearly 
constituted persecution. 259 
Moreover, Alla Pitcherskaia will not have to prove punitive 
intent on remand because the Ninth Circuit's defmition must 
be applied.260 The Fifth Circuit's punitive intent standard is 
subjective and thus more difficult to prove than an objective 
defmition.261 To prove punitive intent, an applicant has to en-
ter into the mind of the perpetrator and divine his thoughts, 
motivations and goals in order to prove persecution. 262 In con-
trast, the Ninth Circuit's standard can objectively measure a 
persecutor's acts by what a reasonable person would consider 
to be offensive.263 Further, under the Fifth Circuit's defmition 
of persecution, Pitcherskaia would probably have already been 
252. See id. 
253. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 646. 
254. See id. 
255. Id. at 648. 
256. See id. 
257. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d 641. 
258. See id. at 648. 
259. See id. at 648. 
260. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 647. 
261. See id. 
262. See id. 
263. See id. 
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deported to Russia where the authorities may have forced her 
to undergo electroshock "therapy.n264 
Lesbians and gay men, like all human beings, should not 
have to tolerate any form of involuntary subjugation because 
the persecutor may not have punitive intent in mind. This 
would be a devastating defInition of persecution for asylum ap-
plicants such as Pitcherskaia, Kasinga and others who have 
suffered from offensive harm but have been unable to prove an 
intent to punish. Persecutors can easily deny or manipulate 
their true intent. Their motives may even be benign, although 
the result is harmful. 265 Thus, under the punitive intent stan-
dard, the asylum applications of lesbians, gay men and other 
victims who have suffered from benign persecution could be 
denied. These applicants could be deported to countries where 
they may be subjected to offensive suffering, harm or even 
death. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's defInition of persecution, 
one that does not require punitive intent, should be the uni-
form standard for U.S. asylum law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Historically, the United States has benefIted from its tradi-
tion of providing a refuge for those who flee intolerance. When 
U.S. law denies asylum for the victims of persecution, it rejects 
this country's legacy. Lesbians and gay men around the world 
continue to suffer from different forms of persecution because 
of their sexual orientation. When these men and women at-
tempt to escape harm by applying for asylum in the U.S., the 
law and the INS still present legal barriers. 
However, U.S. law has slowly progressed in a manner more 
favorable to their successful asylum application. To facilitate 
this progress, all Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals should uni-
formly adopt a defmition of persecution that allows lesbians, 
gay men and other applicants to escape benign persecution. 
264. Compare gerwrally Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997), with 
Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d. 185 (5th Cir.1994). 
265. In re Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. 3278. 
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This form of persecution causes as much offensive harm to its 
victim as punitive persecution. The Ninth Circuit summarized 
the truthful reality clearly and correctly: "Persecution by any 
other name remains persecution."266 Asylum law should protect 
all who are persecuted, regardless of the form persecution may 
take. 
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